Introduction
The economic malaise of the 1970s and 80s has revived interest in the economic long wave or Kondratiev cycle (Kondratiev 1935) . Numerous theories of the long wave have emerged in the past 10 years, including theories stressing innovation, labor dynamics, resource scarcity, and class struggle.
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Since 1975 the System Dynamics National Model (NM) has provided an increasingly rich theory of the long wave (Forrester 1981 (Forrester , 1979 (Forrester , 1977 (Forrester , 1976 Graham and Senge 1980; Senge 1982; Sterman 1984) . Though the model focuses primarily on economic forces, the theory emerging from the NM is not monocausal: it relates capital investment; employment, wages, and workforce participation; inflation and interest rates; aggregate demand; monetary and fiscal policy; innovation and productivity; and even political values. The NM is unique among recent theories of the long wave in that it views the long wave as a syndrome consisting of interrelated symptoms and springing from the interactions of many factors. The NM integrates diverse hypotheses about the genesis of the long wave. The NM also provides an analytical framework in which alternative theories can be tested in a rigorous and reproducible manner.
This paper describes the integrated theory of the long wave that has now emerged from the NM. The behavioral underpinnings of the theory are discussed and contrasted against traditional economic theory. The major sources of the long wave are presented and analyzed through simulations.
Though not intended as a definitive treatment of empirical evidence for long waves, the paper presents some of the basic corroborative evidence to show how the NM endogenously generates a wide range of economic data.
Behavioral Foundations
The NM is a structural, behavioral model. It is a dynamic, disequilibrium model. These features distinguish the NM from econometric and optimizing models (such as general equilibrium models) in several important respects.
Macrobehavior from Microstructure
The NM is a structural model. Structure as used here includes the physical structure of the economy (the stock and flow networks of capital, goods, people, and money), flows of information about the state of the system, and the behavioral decision rules people use to manage their affairs. The structure of the economy is represented at the microeconomic level of individuals and firms. By modeling decisionmaking and the physical structure of the system at the microlevel, the macrolevel dynamics of the economy emerge naturally out of the interactions of the system components. Because such models provide a behavioral description of the economy firmly rooted in managerial practice, they are well suited for examining the dynamic effects of policy initiatives.
Disequilibrium Dynamics
The model does not assume that the economy is always in equilibrium, or that it moves smoothly from one equilibrium to another. Though individuals may be striving for equilibrium, disequilibrium is the rule rather than the exception. To properly model adjustment dynamics, one must not presume the stability of the system. Rather one must model the pressures that may lead to equilibrium, including the way people perceive and react to imbalances, and the delays, constraints, and inadequate information that often confound them.
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The behavioral assumptions of the model rest on the theory of bounded rationality (Cyert and March 1963 , Merton 1936 , Nelson and Winter 1982 , Simon 1947 , 1957 . The essence of the theory is summarized in the principle of bounded rationality, as formulated by Herbert Simon (1957, p. 198) :
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problem whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality.
The theory of bounded rationality provides both theoretical underpinnings and a rich data base for the development of behavioral models in economics. 2 Bounded rationality has several important implications for behavioral modeling of economic dynamics.
Limited information-processing capability:
Humans have a limited ability to process information. As a consequence, "perception of information is not comprehensive but selective" (Hogarth 1980, p. 4;  original emphasis). Human decisions are made on the basis of a small number of cues rather than an extensive appraisal of the situation.
Further, people rely on information they judge to be relatively certain, and on information they believe to be causally important. But at the same time the mental models people construct to guide their decisions are often systematically incorrect. Learning, which might gradually eliminate such biases and errors through "natural selection," is often slow and hindered by the limited information available, by the common tendency to ignore 
Origin of the Long Wave
The long wave is characterized by successive waves of overexpansion and collapse of the economy, particularly the capital-producing sector.
Overexpansion means an increase in the capacity to produce and in the production of plant, equipment, and goods relative to the amount needed to replace worn-out units and provide for growth over the long run.
Overexpansion is undesirable because, eventually, production and employment must be cut back below normal to reduce the excess. of orders, and in increasing output and shipping it to the retailer, mean the retailer's inventories will decline. Backlogs will rise. To correct these imbalances, the retailer must place more orders with suppliers, expanding orders above customer demand. Orders must remain above customer demand long enough to replenish inventories and work off the excess backlogs. Thus customer demand is amplified by the stock adjustments caused by the delays in receiving goods.
But the situation is worse: a higher volume of business requires a larger stock of inventory to maintain the same coverage ratio. So orders to suppliers must rise even farther above demand to build inventories up to a higher level consistent with the higher demand. Further, retailers may find themselves unable to get the units they need to meet demand and replenish inventories. As a direct result of the surge in orders, the lead time for supplies may rise, since the suppliers face delays in ordering their own parts and materials, hiring new workers, and expanding capacity.
Faced with rising delivery times, retailers may hedge by ordering still more and placing orders with more than one supplier, a process described by economist Thomas W. Mitchell (1923, p. 645): Retailers find that there is a shortage of merchandise at their sources of supply. Manufacturers inform them that it is with regret that they are able to fill their orders only to the extent of 80 per cent; there has been an unaccountable shortage of materials that has prevented them from producing to their full capacity. They hope to be able to give full service next season, by which time, no doubt, these unexplainable conditions will have been remedied. However, retailers, having been disappointed in deliveries and lost 20 per cent or more of their possible profits thereby, are not going to be caught that way again. During the season they have tried with little success to obtain supplies from other sources. But next season, if they want 90 units of an article, they order 100, so as to be sure, each, of getting the 90 in the pro rata share delivered. Probably they are disappointed a second time. Hence they increase the margins of their orders over what they desire, in order that their pro rata shares shall be for each the full 100 per cent that he really wants. Furthermore, to make doubly sure, each merchant spreads his orders over more sources of supply.
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Such hoarding behavior is quite common. A recent example is provided by the paper industry, which, faced with surging demand and operating at 97 percent of capacity instituted "an allocation system in which, for example, everyone receives just 90 percent of an order." As a result, "many customers are also 'double booking' --placing orders with two manufacturers to make sure their needs are met, then often canceling one of them" (The New York Times, 5 April 1984, p. D-1).
Other sources of amplification include growth expectations and the spread of optimism, as described by Wesley C. Mitchell (1941, p. 5) :
Virtually all business problems involve elements that are not precisely known, but must be approximately estimated even for the present, and forecast still more roughly for the future. Probabilities take the place of certainties, both among the data upon which reasoning proceeds and among the conclusions at which it arrives. This fact gives hopeful or despondent moods a large share in shaping business decisions.... Most men find their spirits raised by being in optimistic company. Therefore, when the first beneficiaries of a trade revival develop a cheerful frame of mind about the business outlook, they become centers of infection, and start an epidemic of optimism.
Additional amplification arises because the increase in customer demand and lagged response of production will boost prices, causing further expansion of orders and output as profits rise (Mass 1980) . Simple models show that the amplification of demand by inventory and backlog adjustments leads, in isolation, to highly damped oscillations in capital investment with periods of approximately 20 years (Mass 1975 , Sterman 1984 ). Yet the long wave is a 50 year fluctuation which does not die away. The long period, large amplitude, and persistent nature of the cycle arise from a wide range of self-reinforcing processes which operate in the economy as a whole. These positive feedback loops couple different firms to one another and to the household and financial sectors of the economy. The net effect of these self-reinforcing processes is to further amplify the inherently oscillatory tendencies of individual firms, stretching out the period and increasing the amplitude of the fluctuations.
Analysis of the model isolates several independent processes which contribute to the 50 year cycle of overexpansion and economic decline.
Capital Self-ordering
The National Model distinguishes producers of capital plant, equipment, and basic materials from other firms in the private sector. The capital sector differs from others due to the existence of "self-ordering."
In order to expand capacity, producers of capital plant and equipment must order additional plant and equipment from each other. In the aggregate, the capital-producing sector acquires capital from itself, hence selfordering. Though all sectors of the economy are linked to one another to some degree, self-ordering is strongest in the industries that produce capital plant and equipment, basic industries such as steel, and other heavy industry (Sterman 1982) .
To illustrate the role of self-ordering in the long wave, consider the economy in equilibrium. If the demand for consumer goods and services increases, the consumer-goods industry must expand its capacity and so places orders for new factories, equipment, vehicles, etc. To supply the higher volume of orders, the capital-producing sector must also expand its capital stock and hence place orders for more buildings, machines, rolling stock, trucks, etc., causing the total demand for capital to rise still further in a self-reinforcing spiral of increasing orders, a greater need for expansion, and still more orders. Rising orders deplete the inventories and swell the backlogs of capitalsector firms, leading to further pressure to expand and still more orders.
During the downturn, low backlogs and involuntary inventory accumulation further depress demand, leading to still more excess inventory. Figure 4 shows the effect of inventory and backlog pressures on desired production of capital by the capital sector. The "output discrepancy" measures the need to adjust production above or below the order rate in order to bring inventories and backlogs into balance with their desired levels. A positive output discrepancy indicates inadequate inventory and bloated backlogs are boosting desired production above orders. As shown, the output discrepancy of the capital sector builds up during the expansion D-3577 phase of the long wave, forcing desired production well above orders, even as orders are rising, and substantially reinforcing the demand for capital.
Peaking shortly before the peak of real GNP, the output discrepancy collapses precipitously during the long wave decline as excess inventories rapidly accumulate.
4.2.2. Amplification Caused by Rising Lead Times for Capital: As shown in figure 5 , the delivery delay for capital rises well above normal during the long wave expansion. Delivery delay tends to peak four to 10 years in advance of real GNP, reaches normal levels roughly at the time of the peak, and drops well below normal during the downturn of the cycle. As the demand for capital outstrips capacity during the long wave expansion, backlogs rise, causing lead times for plant and equipment to rise. Capital producers find it takes longer than anticipated to acquire new capacity, causing capacity to lag further behind desired levels, creating still more pressure to order and further swelling the demand for capital. In addition, longer lead times force capital producers to order farther ahead, further augmenting orders, as described by T. W. Mitchell.
The delivery delay for goods likewise fluctuates with the long wave.
During the long wave expansion, capital is scarce, and the goods sector 
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At that point, the self-ordering loops reverse: a reduction in orders further reduces the demand for capital, leading to a contraction in the capital sector's output, followed by declining employment, wages, aggregate demand, and production of goods and services. Capital production must remain below the level required for replacement and long-run growth until the excess physical and financial capital is depreciated--a process that may take a decade or more due to the long lifetimes of plant and equipment.
Once the capital stock is worn out, investment rises, triggering the next upswing.
To illustrate, consider the development of the U.S. economy after World War II. The capital stock of the economy was old and severely depleted after 15 years of depression and wartime production. Demand for all types of capital equipment--roads, houses, schools, factories, machines--surged. A massive rebuilding began. In order to both satisfy long-run demand, fill pent-up demand, and rebuild the capital and infrastructure, the capital-producing sector had to expand beyond the long-run needs of the economy. The overexpansion of the capital-producing sector was exacerbated by self-ordering: as the demand for consumer goods, services, and housing rose, manufacturers of capital plant and equipment had to expand their own capacity, further swelling the demand for structures, equipment, materials, transportation, and other infrastructure.
Thus self-ordering helped trigger the boom of the 1950s and '60s. By the late 1960s, the capital stock had been largely rebuilt, and investment began to slow to levels consistent with replacement and long-run growth.
Excess capacity and unemployment began to show up in basic industries.
Faced with excess capacity, investment in these industries was cut back, further reducing the need for capital and reinforcing the decline in investment as the economy moved through the 1970s and into the 1980s.
Self-ordering is one of the most important and fundamental causes of the long wave. Simple models that include only the most basic selfordering feedbacks can generate a robust long wave (Sterman 1984) .
Self-ordering is therefore a sufficient cause of long waves.
Employment and Wages
Self-ordering, though it may be sufficient to generate the long wave,
is not the only mechanism at work. Other positive feedback loops operate through the labor markets to add additional amplification (figure 7). As 
Real Interest Rates and Inflation
Another major mechanism that contributes to the long wave revolves around the dynamics of interest rates and inflation. Historically, long wave expansions have been periods of low or even negative real interest rates, especially in the later part of the expansion. Near the peaks, real interest rates have risen sharply and remained at high levels through the downturns and into the depression periods. Figure 11 shows the real interest rate from 1960 to the present.
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Real rates declined gradually from 1960 to the mid-'70s, when they were generally negative.
After 1979 real rates rose sharply and remain at the highest levels since the deflation of 1929 to 1933 caused real rates to soar.
In the current long-wave downturn, the high level of real interest rates has been blamed on restrictive monetary policies and high government
deficits. Yet the National Model generates the same historical pattern (low, then sharply rising real interest rates over the long wave expansion, D-3577 peak, and downturn) without a tightening of monetary policy or large deficits. Figure 12 shows the simulated behavior of real interest rates over the long wave. Real rates fall steadily during the expansion, becoming negative just before the peak. As the economy declines, real rates rise sharply and remain high through the trough.
The role of real interest rates in the long wave is described in detail by Senge (1983) , and shown in figure 13 . Early in the long wave expansion, the demand for goods and especially capital is growing, putting upward pressure on prices. As prices rise, the real interest rate falls, encouraging still more investment. The resulting expansion in investment demand and the demand for assets such as land and housing puts further upward pressure on prices, and the resulting increase in inflation further reduces real interest rates. During the downturn, the process reverses.
As demand for capital, land, housing, and other assets falls (due to the buildup of excess capacity), prices soften and inflation subsides. Real interest rates therefore rise, discouraging investment still further, creating still more downward pressure on prices, and reinforcing the rise in real interest rates.
The strength of the reinforcing mechanism involving inflation and real interest rates depends on a lag between a change in inflation and the response of nominal interest rates. If nominal rates rapidly and accurately adjusted to the rate of inflation, then the real rate would remain quite stable, and the process described above would be weak. The historical evidence verifies that nominal interest rates do not immediately adjust to changes in inflation, but rather lag significantly behind (Senge 1983 
Debt/Deflation Spiral
Another major process that contributes to the long wave, closely related to the behavior of real interest rates, lies in the dynamics of debt and aggregate prices.
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As shown in figure 15 , debt levels and aggregate prices are relatively low at the end of a long-wave downturn, the result of liquidation and price cutting in the face of unemployment and idle capacity. As the expansion phase gets under way, firms, particularly in the capital sectors, take on more debt in order to finance the expansion. Debt relative to GNP rises and the money supply expands. Expansion of debt is justified because vigorous growth, high rates of capacity utilization, high profitability, and low real interest rates all encourage expansion of external financing.
Toward the later years of the expansion, investment in capital begins to soften as excess capacity develops. The upward momentum of prices and money growth may then trigger a continuing expansion of debt through speculation in land, stocks, precious metals, or other assets. Near the peak of the long wave, overcapacity develops and investment falls, depressing employment and aggregate demand. With declining income, the ability to service the debt falls, and bankruptcies increase. Prices soften as the growing debt burden depresses aggregate demand, further squeezing debt service ability and forcing additional liquidations.
During the long-wave downturn, debt is liquidated and prices typically fall. In such a debt/deflation spiral, as described by Irving Fisher 
Technology and Innovation
Following in the tradition of Schumpeter (1939) , much of the renaissance of interest in long waves has centered on the role of technology and innovation (see note 1; also Mansfield 1983, and Rosenberg and Frischtak 1983) . Fifty year long waves in innovation have been independently identified by several investigators (Mensch 1979 , Hochgraf 1983 . Renewed commitment to R&D and other policies to stimulate "leading edge" high-tech sectors such as information processing and bioengineering are often recommended as prime components of an effective strategy to counter the long wave (Freeman et al. 1982 , Van Duijn 1983 , Dickson 1983 .
In contrast to the innovation theories of the long wave, the National
Model suggests a long wave theory of innovation better describes the situation. The NM shows how fundamental physical processes. in the economy can create the long wave without any variation in innovation rates. The bunching of innovations can thus be explained as the result of entrainment of the innovation process by the long wave (Graham and Senge 1980 , p.
283-84):
The long wave creates a shifting historical context for the implementation of new inventions. Midway into a capital expansion, opportunities for applying new inventions that require new types of capital become poor. The nation is already committed to a particular mix of technologies, and the environment greatly favors improvement innovations over basic innovations. During a long-wave downturn, basic innovation opportunities gradually improve, as old capital embodying the technologies of the preceding buildup depreciates. Near the trough of the wave, there are great opportunities for creating new capital embodying radical new technologies. The old capital base is obsolescent, bureacracies that thwarted basic innovation have weakened, many companies committed to producing old types of capital are bankrupt, and traditional methods are no longer sacrosanct.
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Though innovation is not necessary to explain the long wave, there is little doubt that each long wave seems to be built around a particular ensemble of basic technologies, including particular forms of energy, transport, communications, and materials. These ensembles evolve synergistically and, like species in an ecosystem, compete against other candidates for a limited number of available niches.
The impact of technology and innovation on the long wave itself, on its strength, period, and character, remains less certain. The strong influence of the self-ordering, labor, and interest rate dynamics suggests innovation is not likely to be a high leverage point for countering the long wave (Sterman 1983 , Forrester et al. 1983 . Much work needs to be done to examine how innovation might feed back and affect the other As in the case of technology, the effect of social value shifts on the severity and length of the long wave remains terra incognita. The connection between political values and international conflict may be especially important here, especially in view of the theories that relate war to the long wave (Goldstein 1983 ). Long wave research should broaden the boundary of analysis to include the effects of the long wave on international relations, including trade, debt, foreign aid, and conflict.
Conclusion
The National Model has been the vehicle for the development of an integrated theory of the economic long wave. Analysis of the full NM and of simple models has shown that the long wave is a complex phenomenon which
influences a wide range of economic and social factors. In contrast to several recent theories, the National Model shows there is no single cause of the long wave. Rather, the long wave is the result of the interaction of the physical structure of the economy and the decisionmaking of individuals and firms. The long wave springs from fundamental processes and structures in industrial economies. It is generated endogenously, and does not depend on random shocks such as gold discoveries to account for its persistence or for turning points.
In essence, the long wave arises from two fundamental characteristics of economic systems:
1. Inherent oscillatory tendencies of firms. Due to the inevitable lags in acquiring factors of production and reacting to changes in demand, firms tend to amplify unanticipated changes in demand, creating the potential for oscillation in the adjustment of production capacity to demand. 1. Van Duijn (1983) provides an excellent overview of long wave theories new and old. For innovation theories, see Schumpeter (1939) and Mensch (1979) . Freeman et al. (1982) focus on unemployment and innovation. See Rostow (1975 Rostow ( , 1978 and Mandel (1980 Mandel ( , 1981 for theories based on resource scarcity and class struggle, respectively. See also Freeman (1983) for a survey of contemporary long wave theories.
2. Good overviews are provided by Hogarth (1980) and Kahneman et al. (1982) . See Morecroft (1983) on the connection of bounded rationality and system dynamics. Nelson and Winter (1982) also apply bounded rationality to macroeconomic modeling.
3. Hogarth (1980) and Kahneman et al. (1982) discuss numerous separate sources of bias in decisionmaking. Common fallacies of causal attribution include the gambler's fallacy and the regression fallacy.
4. For discussion of the issues involved in the identification of long waves from empirical data, see Forrester et al. (1983) . Anecdotal and other descriptive data (e.g. Rezneck 1968) are extremely useful and corroborate the timing of the long wave established through examination of the numerical data.
5. Though population and technological progress are exogenous, they are assumed to grow at absolutely uniform fractional rates. Historical time series for population and technology are not used. Thus the long wave and its timing in the simulation are not due to exogenous variables.
6. See Metzler (1941) , Mass (1975) , Low (1980), and Forrester (1982) , for dynamic models of the business and Kuznets cycles that stress the role of stock adjustments. For empirical work on the Kuznets cycle, see e.g. Kuznets (1930) and Hickman (1963) .
7. Exogenous random noise is still active in the simulation.
8. The multiplier effect can be derived by assuming that in equilibrium (i) capital production equals the investment of the goods sector plus the investment of the capital sector: KPR=GINV+KINV; (ii) production is related to capital stock by the capital output ratio: KPR=KC/KCOR; (iii) the investment of the capital sector in equilibrium equals physical depreciation. In equilibrium, discards are given by the capital stock divided by the average life of capital: KINV=KC/KALC. See Frisch (1933) and Sterman (1984) .
9. Simulated employment and capital stock in the capital sector are shown. Because no historical time series are used to drive the model and because of the noise included to excite the business cycle, the pointby-point behavior of the model differs from the data. Nevertheless, the model captures the qualitative patterns of the actual data extremely well.
10. The real interest rate shown in figure 11 is given by the yield of 3-month Treasury bills less the rate of inflation as measured by the implicit price deflator. 
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